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Abstract
Multiple economic experiments suggest that the moral context of consumption and/or
production influences willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. Precisely how this
influence should be modeled from a theoretical perspective, however, remains understudied.
The prevailing view is that moral context can be captured using an extended utility approach
in which “morality” enters the utility function as any other attribute of value. However, in our
view the literature does not yet suggest practical modeling strategies that yield testable
hypotheses. We show herein that the state-dependent preference approach quite naturally
enables modeling of the moral concerns registered in experimental settings.
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1. Introduction 
A key area in which scholars tend to disagree regards the appropriate treatment of 
moral dimensions in an agent’s decision-making.  Since this disagreement affects every 
policy recommendation and outcome, a significant research literature has tried to bring 
the economic concept of morality into clearer focus.  Economists have traditionally 
argued that all relevant effects of morality are adequately—and fairly automatically—
captured by an individual’s fixed utility function or preference relation.  There are two 
interrelated strands of economic literature that motivate this assertion.  First, as proposed 
by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), economists define individual 
morality in terms of the actions and outcomes that would be approved by the individual if 
he or she could step back from them and take the view of an “impartial spectator”.  The 
concept Smith had in mind has, in its essence, also been enunciated in the economics 
literature and other literatures as the Golden Rule, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and 
Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance.  Multiple economists in the modern era are engaged in the 
formalization of this basic concept and in the design of policy instruments that might 
support individually and socially efficient outcomes in the presence of moral concerns.  
See, for instance, Laffont (1975), Bilodeau and Gravel (2004), Blackorby et al. (2000), 
Karni (1998), and Karni and Safra (2002a, 2002b). 
A second strand of economic literature argues that concerns for morality can and 
must be accounted for in the utility function or preference relation in a manner that 
requires individuals to face opportunity costs in choices that may compromise or support 
their moral integrity.  This aspect is presented most forcefully by Kaplow and Shavell 
(2001, 2002, 2003), but is also clearly present in some of the works cited above as well as 
in the works of Frey et al. (1996), Frey (1997), Isaac (1997), Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 
(2001), Frey et al. (2004) and Kotchen (2005), among others.  This literature essentially 
proposes an extended utility approach through which concepts that some scholars 
consider deontological in nature may nevertheless be imbedded within the traditional 
welfarist economic paradigm. 
As advanced and as insightful as the above literature is, we do not find that it is 
quite able to suggest a relatively practical means of capturing moral economic context 
detected in multiple economic experiments.  For instance, Boyce et al. (1992) stopped 
short of suggesting how the moral context they uncover in their experiment regarding 
Norfolk pines could be modeled as a generalized extension of their work, and we are not 
aware of research that proposes such an extension.  And we agree with Bulte et al. (2005, 
330, 338) when they write: “Standard applications of utility theory assume that utility 
depends solely on outcomes and not on causes...[However], Now that we find that cause 
matters, it is of course important to rethink the formal model that underlies the CVM 
(Contingent Valuation Model).”  We maintain that the multiple “causes” of the agents’ 
concern are multiple moral contexts that we address herein.    
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate a concrete extension of the standard 
utility representation of consumer choice that is both consistent with the two major 
strands of economic literature regarding morality and that will enable us to motivate in a 
theoretical manner the important experimental results of Boyce et al. (1992), Bulte et al. 
(2005) and others.  The extension regards taking a state-dependent preference approach 
to choices in which moral context matters.  This approach suggests itself because 
experiments indicate that perceived changes in the moral context of consumption serve to 
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“change” the agent’s preferences for the good per se such that the agent’s moral 
sentiments modulate the marginal rate of substitution between goods and services.  Moral 
sentiment is not purchased directly but only through the consumption of bundles of goods 
and services that are available in multiple moral contexts.  This conceptualization of 
moral choice leads us to posit that agents possess fixed “collections of indifference curve 
sets,” one of which is drawn upon per moral context faced.   
Of course, this is analogous to situations that arise in other microeconomic 
contexts in which agents face multiple states and a movement along a stationary 
indifference curve must be distinguished theoretically from a twist in the level set of 
curves.  For instance, in the health economics literature, Jones-Lee (1974), Weinstein et 
al. (1980), Viscusi and Evans (1990), and Evans and Viscusi (1991) analyze consumer 
choice from the perspective that one utility function prevails in the good state (“well” or 
“alive”) and another function prevails in the bad state (“ill” or “dead”).  In an industrial 
organization context, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) analyze consumer desire for 
mandatory product safety testing rules using a model in which each consumer’s marginal 
rate of substitution over the (potentially) tested good and a numeraire good increases in 
the state of the (potentially) tested good’s quality.  And in an environmental economics 
context, Smith and Desvousges (1987, 1988) bring a state-dependent preference approach 
to bear upon the problem of measuring the benefits of morbidity and mortality risk 
reductions.  In all of these models, the agent’s preferences for the good per se are 
unchanged; however, the agent’s preferences for the good within alternative states 
(contexts) do change. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we describe in greater detail aspects 
of the morality-and-economics literature described above that motivate our approach.  
We then show how a state-dependent preference approach enables natural expression of 
the moral context evident in the experimental findings of Boyce et al. (1992) and Bulte et 
al. (2005).  In these instances, there is no uncertainty over which moral context the agent 
faces, and the state-dependent preference model straightforwardly yields two willingness-
to-pay functions corresponding to the two possible moral contexts.  We conclude in 
Section 3, and propose a particular area for future research that considers the effects of 
uncertainty over moral states.   
 
2.  Modeling Moral Context Under Certainty 
The significant literature we referenced in Section 1, taken as a whole, suggests 
that capturing moral economic context in consumer choice problems requires a suitable 
extension of the individual’s stable, well-defined utility function or preference relation. 
When confronted with a consumption choice that is perceived to threaten moral integrity, 
the moral individual must be willing to react by giving up an increment of numeraire 
good or money.  The approach we set forth is motivated by two specific experimental 
results in the environmental economics literature: the consumption of Norfolk pines in 
different moral contexts (“kill and no-kill”) discussed in Boyce et al. (1992), and the 
extent to which cause (human or nature) of environmental change matters, as discussed 
by Bulte et al. (2005).   
  The “Norfolk pines” experiment revealed the phenomenon that people gain utility 
from Norfolk pines per se (when there is no information given or inquired about the 
disposition of unsold trees) as well as from the treatment of unsold trees.  There is a 
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corresponding willingness to pay for the trees per se, taking one’s budget constraint into 
account.  When what may be called the “moral context” changes to include exogenously 
provided information that unsold trees would be destroyed, the willingness to pay (and 
accept) was found to have increased.   
Bulte et al. (2005) conduct a field experiment in which the willingness to pay for 
seal conservation efforts in the Netherlands was estimated.  As they discuss, it is an open 
question in the literature as to specifically how willingness to pay reports are related to 
knowledge of whether the environmental problem at hand has a natural or human cause.  
In their study, they find that the willingness to pay is sensitive to natural versus human 
causes of damage; in particular, participants in their study were willing to pay 
significantly more to mitigate human causes of damage, which the authors call “the 
outrage effect”.  However, they did not find evidence of the “moral responsibility effect”, 
wherein some scholars such as Walker et al. (1999) assert that the willingness to pay (and 
accept) should rise with the level of personal responsibility an individual feels toward an 
environmental problem caused by either nature or humans.  In the presence of such a 
moral responsibility effect, the willingness to pay to deal with a nature-caused 
environmental problem could well be higher than the willingness to pay for human-
caused damage; indeed, this is just what Walker et al. (1999) found in their experiments.     
The above studies, among others, highlight the necessity of specifying a priori the 
structure of moral context in the individual’s economic problem.  The morality-and-
economics literature suggests that the moral context of consumption and production is but 
another quality attribute of the good in question which can therefore be considered within 
the utility function alongside other attributes.  However, the literature has not yet taken 
the step of specifying precisely how moral context can be modeled in a concrete manner 
that lends itself to empirical testing of its presence and magnitude.  The state-dependent 
preference approach, utilized in several theoretical and empirical microeconomic 
investigations, provides a natural way forward.  We next show that by taking this 
approach, one can argue that adding or subtracting a moral dimension to the consumption 
of Norfolk pines amplifies or reduces the intensity of preference for Norfolk pines.   
 Suppose  the  representative agent in Boyce et al.’s (1992) experiment is presented 
with the opportunity to consume Norfolk pine trees (T) and a numeraire good (N), and 
the agent is aware that there are two possible states in which this consumption can take 
place: unsold trees may be kept alive (state A), or unsold trees may be destroyed (state 
D).  Thus, the superior moral context corresponds to state D, for each tree purchased is a 
tree that will not be destroyed.  If the agent is uncertain which moral context (state) will 
materialize, then in the simplest specification the agent would possess a subjective 
probability assessment  A π  that state A will obtain, and probability assessment 
D A π π = − 1  that state D will obtain.  The state-preference approach leads us to posit that, 
in general, the representative agent has a state-dependent expected utility function over S 
states of the form: 
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In our two-state situation under immediate consideration, we have: 
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This framework enables us to disentangle the utility the agent may derive from 
trees per se from the utility the agent derives from preserving or growing one’s moral 
integrity through modulating the consumption of goods such as trees in alternative moral 
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Given these assumptions, the marginal rate of substitution of T for N decreases in 























.         ( 4 )      
With regard to the experimental results of Boyce et al. (1992) and Bulte et al. 
(2005), the representative agent knows ex ante that the probability  A π  is either zero or 
one; that is, there is no uncertainty regarding the moral context.  If the moral context is 
known to be that in which the unsold trees will be kept alive (s = A), or if the moral 
context is known to be that in which the unsold trees will be destroyed (s = D), then (2) 
can be written as (5a) or (5b), respectively: 
) , ( ) , ( T N U T N U A =          ( 5 a )  
) , ( ) , ( T N U T N U D =          ( 5 b )  
The agent’s abstract problem is to choose N and T to maximize either (5a) or (5b) 
subject to a standard, linear budget constraint such as M T p N p T N = + , where N and T 
are assumed to be available at constant prices, and M denotes the agent’s nominal income 
or endowment.  We may obtain particular solutions that illustrate this state-dependent 
preference approach under certainty by assuming a continuous and differentiable 
functional form such as Cobb-Douglas.
2  Maximizing (5a) and (5b) in turn, subject to the 
budget constraint, and jointly solving the first-order conditions yields the optimality 
condition that Norfolk pines and the numeraire good be consumed such that the marginal 
rate of substitution in each context equals its respective price ratio.  The bundles that are 
obtained in each moral context are illustrated below in Figure 1.  Each indifference curve, 
including the one through the original consumption bundle, is flatter than before.  This 
being the case, utility in the presence of the higher moral context (state D) is no longer 
                                                 
1 This is a standard aspect of the state-dependent preference approach; see Matthews and Postlewaite (1985, 
335, Eq. 6), for instance. 
2 Viscusi and Evans (1990), for instance, utilize a Cobb-Douglas utility parameterization within their state-
dependent preference framework. 
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maximized at the original bundle.  The new maximizing bundle is now somewhere to the 










  Notice that in relating this change to the demand for Norfolk pines, the enhanced 
moral context with no change in the price of Norfolk pines yields a new quantity 
demanded on a new, higher demand curve for Norfolk pines.  This is a standard result in 
the state-dependent preference literature; see, for instance, Matthews and Postlewaite 
(1985, 335).  We illustrate the importance of this general result in the specific 
experimental results of Boyce et al. (1992) in Figure 2 below. 
The first point on the (Marshallian, uncompensated) demand graph is ( )
0
0, T p T  and 
the new point is( )
0
1, T p T .  That is, when the price of trees per se is unchanged but the 
moral context changes from “alive” to “destroyed”, the quantity demanded of trees would 
rise from  to .  Now, what Boyce et al. observed was an increase in the willingness to 
pay.  Notice that one may sketch a downward sloping inverse Marshallian demand 
function through each of these two points, elucidating the shift in demand.  With these 
two functions on the graph, we can deduce that the increase in the willingness to pay for 
Norfolk pines corresponding to the morally threatening moral context of their 
consumption is the vertical distance between the functions at each T.  (The prices of 
$7.81 and $4.81 are the mean willingnesses to pay, taken from Boyce et al. (1992, 
1370).) 
0 T 1 T
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3.  Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
The above discussion suggests that our model serves several purposes. Foremost, 
it is a general model that provides theoretical structure for the testable hypotheses 
explored by Boyce et al. (1992) and Bulte et al. (2005).  If the moral context changes to 
one that poses a challenge to the agent’s moral integrity, the willingness to pay for the 
good in question should rise, as Boyce et al. find in their study.  The extent to which it 
rises is a good estimate for the intensity of moral threat posed by the change.  Likewise, 
we can imagine situations in which the moral context changes to one that seems 
enhancing to one’s moral integrity, easing the willingness to pay for the relevant good or 
service.  For instance, in the Boyce et al. Norfolk pines experiment, instead of (or in 
addition to) informing one of the participant groups that unsold trees would be destroyed, 
one participant group could be informed that unsold trees will be used by the public 
works department to landscape the most neglected parks in the local community—those 
that have gone to the proverbial dogs.  Our model motivates the testable hypothesis that 
the mean willingness to pay for such trees should fall, as there is a moral cost to 
purchasing trees in this particular context—those that are purchased for private use will 
not be available for the public use described above.  If the moral context changes to one 
that seems enhancing to the agent’s moral integrity, the willingness to pay for the good in 
question should fall.  This is because relatively less consumption of the good in question 
is necessary to maintain the agent’s sense of moral constitution, and money is freed up 
for other things in the consumption set (including shoring up the consumption of goods 
that have a threatening moral context). Analogously, if the moral context is at odds with 
the agent’s, then she will allocate more resources toward preserving her morality vis-à-
vis consumption of goods that complement her sense of moral well-being. 
  In addition to explaining Boyce et al.’s findings, our framework supports the 
existence of what Bulte et al. refer to as the “outrage effect.” People could be asked for 
their willingness to pay for environmental improvements with no discussion of the cause 
of the environmental problem.  This corresponds in our model to the non-challenging 
state of keeping the unsold trees alive—state A.  Then, as Bulte et al. point out, some 
∆WTP per ∆s 
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causes seem to lead people to lower their willingness to pay (a state even more favorable 
than A, which we do not have in our model above) and some causes seem to lead people 
to raise their willingness to pay (state D in our model).  Our current framework does not 
presently possess enough explanatory power to support or reject the “moral responsibility 
effect” contested by Bulte et al. and upheld by Walker et al.  Although we can capture 
the moral context for human responsibility in general, the model does not leave us in a 
position to more finely ascribe responsibility within that sphere. 
  In addition to these results, we propose that our conceptualization of morality 
could resolve some instances of the “preference reversal phenomenon”, studied most 
recently by List (2002) and Cubitt et al. (2004).  This literature explores instances of 
seemingly paradoxical choices from the hypothesis that preferences may be unstable (as 
in stochastic) and/or ill-defined.  Our model suggests that this dichotomy should be 
generalized to a disjunction that includes the possibility that preferences are deterministic 
(stable, non-stochastic) but are drawn from well-defined state-dependent preferences 
according to particular moral contexts.  If this manner in which moral context affects 
consumer choice is ignored, observed choices can easily lead social scientists to deduce 
that preferences are unstable and/or that the choices violate the transitivity assumption 
required for rationality. 
Let us conclude by discussing one area for future research.  We have assumed 
thus far that the arrival of information that changes the moral context is exogenous (as it 
was in Boyce et al.); agents in that experiment found out about the change in moral 
context for free, and they could not bury their proverbial heads in the sand to avoid being 
presented with this information.  An important issue we have not discussed here is the 
extent to which an agent acting in our framework would seek out (at the expense of time 
and/or money) information about the uncertain moral context of his or her consumption.  
We believe we are bound to find a “don’t ask, don’t tell” result in our model.  That is, 
some agents would rather not be aware of the moral context, as it may ultimately bring 
them lower net welfare.  However, given some initial information about the moral 
context, other agents may be willing to pay to find out additional details.  Such 
investment in information acquisition does not typically make the moral context crystal 
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